Masking Countermeasures Against Side-Channel Attacks on Quantum Computers
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866909455563620352 |
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| author | LeGrow, Jason T. Morrison, Travis Sikora, Jamie Swanson, Nicolas |
| author_facet | LeGrow, Jason T. Morrison, Travis Sikora, Jamie Swanson, Nicolas |
| contents | We propose a modification to the transpiler of a quantum computer to safeguard against side-channel attacks aimed at learning information about a quantum circuit. We demonstrate that if it is feasible to shield a specific subset of gates from side-channel attacks, then it is possible to conceal all information in a quantum circuit by transpiling it into a new circuit whose depth grows linearly, depending on the quantum computer's architecture. We provide concrete examples of implementing this protection on IBM's quantum computers, utilizing their virtual gates and editing their transpiler. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_07695 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Masking Countermeasures Against Side-Channel Attacks on Quantum Computers LeGrow, Jason T. Morrison, Travis Sikora, Jamie Swanson, Nicolas Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security We propose a modification to the transpiler of a quantum computer to safeguard against side-channel attacks aimed at learning information about a quantum circuit. We demonstrate that if it is feasible to shield a specific subset of gates from side-channel attacks, then it is possible to conceal all information in a quantum circuit by transpiling it into a new circuit whose depth grows linearly, depending on the quantum computer's architecture. We provide concrete examples of implementing this protection on IBM's quantum computers, utilizing their virtual gates and editing their transpiler. |
| title | Masking Countermeasures Against Side-Channel Attacks on Quantum Computers |
| topic | Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.07695 |