Gandalf the Red: Adaptive Security for LLMs

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Pfister, Niklas, Volhejn, Václav, Knott, Manuel, Arias, Santiago, Bazińska, Julia, Bichurin, Mykhailo, Commike, Alan, Darling, Janet, Dienes, Peter, Fiedler, Matthew, Haber, David, Kraft, Matthias, Lancini, Marco, Mathys, Max, Pascual-Ortiz, Damián, Podolak, Jakub, Romero-López, Adrià, Shiarlis, Kyriacos, Signer, Andreas, Terek, Zsolt, Theocharis, Athanasios, Timbrell, Daniel, Trautwein, Samuel, Watts, Samuel, Wu, Yun-Han, Rojas-Carulla, Mateo
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Pfister, Niklas
Volhejn, Václav
Knott, Manuel
Arias, Santiago
Bazińska, Julia
Bichurin, Mykhailo
Commike, Alan
Darling, Janet
Dienes, Peter
Fiedler, Matthew
Haber, David
Kraft, Matthias
Lancini, Marco
Mathys, Max
Pascual-Ortiz, Damián
Podolak, Jakub
Romero-López, Adrià
Shiarlis, Kyriacos
Signer, Andreas
Terek, Zsolt
Theocharis, Athanasios
Timbrell, Daniel
Trautwein, Samuel
Watts, Samuel
Wu, Yun-Han
Rojas-Carulla, Mateo
author_facet Pfister, Niklas
Volhejn, Václav
Knott, Manuel
Arias, Santiago
Bazińska, Julia
Bichurin, Mykhailo
Commike, Alan
Darling, Janet
Dienes, Peter
Fiedler, Matthew
Haber, David
Kraft, Matthias
Lancini, Marco
Mathys, Max
Pascual-Ortiz, Damián
Podolak, Jakub
Romero-López, Adrià
Shiarlis, Kyriacos
Signer, Andreas
Terek, Zsolt
Theocharis, Athanasios
Timbrell, Daniel
Trautwein, Samuel
Watts, Samuel
Wu, Yun-Han
Rojas-Carulla, Mateo
contents Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_07927
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Gandalf the Red: Adaptive Security for LLMs
Pfister, Niklas
Volhejn, Václav
Knott, Manuel
Arias, Santiago
Bazińska, Julia
Bichurin, Mykhailo
Commike, Alan
Darling, Janet
Dienes, Peter
Fiedler, Matthew
Haber, David
Kraft, Matthias
Lancini, Marco
Mathys, Max
Pascual-Ortiz, Damián
Podolak, Jakub
Romero-López, Adrià
Shiarlis, Kyriacos
Signer, Andreas
Terek, Zsolt
Theocharis, Athanasios
Timbrell, Daniel
Trautwein, Samuel
Watts, Samuel
Wu, Yun-Han
Rojas-Carulla, Mateo
Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Cryptography and Security
Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.
title Gandalf the Red: Adaptive Security for LLMs
topic Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.07927