Major-Minor Mean Field Game of Stopping: An Entropy Regularization Approach

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Yu, Xiang, Zhang, Jiacheng, Zhang, Keyu, Zhou, Zhou
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Yu, Xiang
Zhang, Jiacheng
Zhang, Keyu
Zhou, Zhou
author_facet Yu, Xiang
Zhang, Jiacheng
Zhang, Keyu
Zhou, Zhou
contents This paper studies a discrete-time major-minor mean field game of stopping where the major player can choose either an optimal control or stopping time. We look for the relaxed equilibrium as a randomized stopping policy, which is formulated as a fixed point of a set-valued mapping, whose existence is challenging by direct arguments. To overcome the difficulties caused by the presence of a major player, we propose to study an auxiliary problem by considering entropy regularization in the major player's problem while formulating the minor players' optimal stopping problems as linear programming over occupation measures. We first show the existence of regularized equilibria as fixed points of some simplified set-valued operator using the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point theorem. Next, we prove that the regularized equilibrium converges as the regularization parameter $λ$ tends to 0, and the limit corresponds to a fixed point of the original operator, thereby confirming the existence of a relaxed equilibrium in the original mean field game problem. We also extend this entropy regularization method to the mean-field game problem where the minor players choose optimal controls.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_08770
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Major-Minor Mean Field Game of Stopping: An Entropy Regularization Approach
Yu, Xiang
Zhang, Jiacheng
Zhang, Keyu
Zhou, Zhou
Optimization and Control
This paper studies a discrete-time major-minor mean field game of stopping where the major player can choose either an optimal control or stopping time. We look for the relaxed equilibrium as a randomized stopping policy, which is formulated as a fixed point of a set-valued mapping, whose existence is challenging by direct arguments. To overcome the difficulties caused by the presence of a major player, we propose to study an auxiliary problem by considering entropy regularization in the major player's problem while formulating the minor players' optimal stopping problems as linear programming over occupation measures. We first show the existence of regularized equilibria as fixed points of some simplified set-valued operator using the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point theorem. Next, we prove that the regularized equilibrium converges as the regularization parameter $λ$ tends to 0, and the limit corresponds to a fixed point of the original operator, thereby confirming the existence of a relaxed equilibrium in the original mean field game problem. We also extend this entropy regularization method to the mean-field game problem where the minor players choose optimal controls.
title Major-Minor Mean Field Game of Stopping: An Entropy Regularization Approach
topic Optimization and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.08770