On the Dominance of Truth-Telling in Gradual Mechanisms
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913758915330048 |
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| author | Wang, Wenqian Zheng, Zhiwen |
| author_facet | Wang, Wenqian Zheng, Zhiwen |
| contents | Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents gradually reveal their private information while acquiring information about others in the process. Our first characterization hinges on the incentive-preservation of a basic transformation on gradual mechanisms called illuminating that partitions information sets. The second relies on a single reaction-proofness condition. We demonstrate the usefulness of both characterizations through applications to second-price auctions and the top-trading cycles algorithm. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_08802 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On the Dominance of Truth-Telling in Gradual Mechanisms Wang, Wenqian Zheng, Zhiwen Theoretical Economics Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents gradually reveal their private information while acquiring information about others in the process. Our first characterization hinges on the incentive-preservation of a basic transformation on gradual mechanisms called illuminating that partitions information sets. The second relies on a single reaction-proofness condition. We demonstrate the usefulness of both characterizations through applications to second-price auctions and the top-trading cycles algorithm. |
| title | On the Dominance of Truth-Telling in Gradual Mechanisms |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.08802 |