Enregistré dans:
Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux: Hellman, Ziv, Pintér, Miklós
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
Sujets:
Accès en ligne:https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.09835
Tags: Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
_version_ 1866910013618913280
author Hellman, Ziv
Pintér, Miklós
author_facet Hellman, Ziv
Pintér, Miklós
contents In a strand of the literature, it is assumed that the common prior has full support; that is, every type of every player is assigned positive probability. Morris (1991,1994) established an epistemological-behavioral duality characterisation of the common prior with full support, showing that a finite type space admits such a prior if and only if it contains no acceptable bet. This result forms the basis of the present paper. The paper makes three contributions: (1) The characterisation of Morris (1991,Morris1994) is extended to infinite type spaces. (2) The extension is robust: it does not depend on whether the infinite model applies countably additive or purely additive probabilities as beliefs. (3) The analysis implies that the notion of a real common prior-understood as a single probability distribution or a set of probability distributions-is not necessarily meaningful.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_09835
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Consistent Beliefs without Common Prior
Hellman, Ziv
Pintér, Miklós
Theoretical Economics
econ.TH
In a strand of the literature, it is assumed that the common prior has full support; that is, every type of every player is assigned positive probability. Morris (1991,1994) established an epistemological-behavioral duality characterisation of the common prior with full support, showing that a finite type space admits such a prior if and only if it contains no acceptable bet. This result forms the basis of the present paper. The paper makes three contributions: (1) The characterisation of Morris (1991,Morris1994) is extended to infinite type spaces. (2) The extension is robust: it does not depend on whether the infinite model applies countably additive or purely additive probabilities as beliefs. (3) The analysis implies that the notion of a real common prior-understood as a single probability distribution or a set of probability distributions-is not necessarily meaningful.
title Consistent Beliefs without Common Prior
topic Theoretical Economics
econ.TH
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.09835