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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.12827 |
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| _version_ | 1866912199412285440 |
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| author | Stichler, Pascal |
| author_facet | Stichler, Pascal |
| contents | This study analyzes proposer-builder data and MEV-Boost payment data following the Ethereum merge in September 2022 to identify patterns of multi-block MEV. Our findings reveal fewer multi-slot sequences of builders than predicted by a random Monte Carlo simulation, with the longest observed sequence spanning 25 slots. Additionally, we observe that average MEV-Boost payments increase with the length of consecutive sequences, from approximately 0.05 ETH for single slots to 0.08 ETH for nine consecutive slots. Within longer sequences, payments per slot show a slight increase, suggesting that builders bid higher for longer sequences or the first slot after a longer sequence. A weak positive autocorrelation is found between subsequent MEV-Boost payments, challenging the hypothesis of alternating periods of low and high MEV. Finally, our comparison of builders during periods of low and high base fee volatility reveals minimal correlation, indicating the absence of builder specialization based on base fee volatility. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_12827 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Does multi-block MEV exist? Analysis of 2 years of MEV Data Stichler, Pascal Computer Science and Game Theory This study analyzes proposer-builder data and MEV-Boost payment data following the Ethereum merge in September 2022 to identify patterns of multi-block MEV. Our findings reveal fewer multi-slot sequences of builders than predicted by a random Monte Carlo simulation, with the longest observed sequence spanning 25 slots. Additionally, we observe that average MEV-Boost payments increase with the length of consecutive sequences, from approximately 0.05 ETH for single slots to 0.08 ETH for nine consecutive slots. Within longer sequences, payments per slot show a slight increase, suggesting that builders bid higher for longer sequences or the first slot after a longer sequence. A weak positive autocorrelation is found between subsequent MEV-Boost payments, challenging the hypothesis of alternating periods of low and high MEV. Finally, our comparison of builders during periods of low and high base fee volatility reveals minimal correlation, indicating the absence of builder specialization based on base fee volatility. |
| title | Does multi-block MEV exist? Analysis of 2 years of MEV Data |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.12827 |