Retrievals Can Be Detrimental: Unveiling the Backdoor Vulnerability of Retrieval-Augmented Diffusion Models

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Hauptverfasser: Fang, Hao, Sui, Xiaohang, Yu, Hongyao, Gao, Kuofeng, Kong, Jiawei, Yu, Sijin, Chen, Bin, Xia, Shu-Tao
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Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Fang, Hao
Sui, Xiaohang
Yu, Hongyao
Gao, Kuofeng
Kong, Jiawei
Yu, Sijin
Chen, Bin
Xia, Shu-Tao
author_facet Fang, Hao
Sui, Xiaohang
Yu, Hongyao
Gao, Kuofeng
Kong, Jiawei
Yu, Sijin
Chen, Bin
Xia, Shu-Tao
contents Diffusion models (DMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable generation capability. However, their training generally requires huge computational resources and large-scale datasets. To solve these, recent studies empower DMs with the advanced Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) technique and propose retrieval-augmented diffusion models (RDMs). By incorporating rich knowledge from an auxiliary database, RAG enhances diffusion models' generation and generalization ability while significantly reducing model parameters. Despite the great success, RAG may introduce novel security issues that warrant further investigation. In this paper, we reveal that the RDM is susceptible to backdoor attacks by proposing a multimodal contrastive attack approach named BadRDM. Our framework fully considers RAG's characteristics and is devised to manipulate the retrieved items for given text triggers, thereby further controlling the generated contents. Specifically, we first insert a tiny portion of images into the retrieval database as target toxicity surrogates. Subsequently, a malicious variant of contrastive learning is adopted to inject backdoors into the retriever, which builds shortcuts from triggers to the toxicity surrogates. Furthermore, we enhance the attacks through novel entropy-based selection and generative augmentation strategies that can derive better toxicity surrogates. Extensive experiments on two mainstream tasks demonstrate the proposed BadRDM achieves outstanding attack effects while preserving the model's benign utility.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_13340
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Retrievals Can Be Detrimental: Unveiling the Backdoor Vulnerability of Retrieval-Augmented Diffusion Models
Fang, Hao
Sui, Xiaohang
Yu, Hongyao
Gao, Kuofeng
Kong, Jiawei
Yu, Sijin
Chen, Bin
Xia, Shu-Tao
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Diffusion models (DMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable generation capability. However, their training generally requires huge computational resources and large-scale datasets. To solve these, recent studies empower DMs with the advanced Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) technique and propose retrieval-augmented diffusion models (RDMs). By incorporating rich knowledge from an auxiliary database, RAG enhances diffusion models' generation and generalization ability while significantly reducing model parameters. Despite the great success, RAG may introduce novel security issues that warrant further investigation. In this paper, we reveal that the RDM is susceptible to backdoor attacks by proposing a multimodal contrastive attack approach named BadRDM. Our framework fully considers RAG's characteristics and is devised to manipulate the retrieved items for given text triggers, thereby further controlling the generated contents. Specifically, we first insert a tiny portion of images into the retrieval database as target toxicity surrogates. Subsequently, a malicious variant of contrastive learning is adopted to inject backdoors into the retriever, which builds shortcuts from triggers to the toxicity surrogates. Furthermore, we enhance the attacks through novel entropy-based selection and generative augmentation strategies that can derive better toxicity surrogates. Extensive experiments on two mainstream tasks demonstrate the proposed BadRDM achieves outstanding attack effects while preserving the model's benign utility.
title Retrievals Can Be Detrimental: Unveiling the Backdoor Vulnerability of Retrieval-Augmented Diffusion Models
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.13340