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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.14071 |
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| _version_ | 1866913663999279104 |
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| author | Cialenco, Igor Ludkovski, Michael |
| author_facet | Cialenco, Igor Ludkovski, Michael |
| contents | We introduce the problem of groundwater trading, capturing the emergent groundwater market setups among stakeholders in a given groundwater basin. The agents optimize their production, taking into account their available water rights, the requisite water consumption, and the opportunity to trade water among themselves. We study the resulting Nash equilibrium, providing a full characterization of the 1-period setting and initial results about the features of the multi-period game driven by the ability of agents to bank their water rights in order to smooth out the intertemporal shocks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_14071 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A groundwater market model Cialenco, Igor Ludkovski, Michael General Finance Optimization and Control 91B76, 91A10, 91B72, 91B70 We introduce the problem of groundwater trading, capturing the emergent groundwater market setups among stakeholders in a given groundwater basin. The agents optimize their production, taking into account their available water rights, the requisite water consumption, and the opportunity to trade water among themselves. We study the resulting Nash equilibrium, providing a full characterization of the 1-period setting and initial results about the features of the multi-period game driven by the ability of agents to bank their water rights in order to smooth out the intertemporal shocks. |
| title | A groundwater market model |
| topic | General Finance Optimization and Control 91B76, 91A10, 91B72, 91B70 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.14071 |