The Manhattan Trap: Why a Race to Artificial Superintelligence is Self-Defeating
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913665212481536 |
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| author | Katzke, Corin Futerman, Gideon |
| author_facet | Katzke, Corin Futerman, Gideon |
| contents | This paper examines the strategic dynamics of international competition to develop Artificial Superintelligence (ASI). We argue that the same assumptions that might motivate the US to race to develop ASI also imply that such a race is extremely dangerous. These assumptions--that ASI would provide a decisive military advantage and that states are rational actors prioritizing survival--imply that a race would heighten three critical risks: great power conflict, loss of control of ASI systems, and the undermining of liberal democracy. Our analysis shows that ASI presents a trust dilemma rather than a prisoners dilemma, suggesting that international cooperation to control ASI development is both preferable and strategically sound. We conclude that cooperation is achievable. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_14749 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Manhattan Trap: Why a Race to Artificial Superintelligence is Self-Defeating Katzke, Corin Futerman, Gideon Computers and Society This paper examines the strategic dynamics of international competition to develop Artificial Superintelligence (ASI). We argue that the same assumptions that might motivate the US to race to develop ASI also imply that such a race is extremely dangerous. These assumptions--that ASI would provide a decisive military advantage and that states are rational actors prioritizing survival--imply that a race would heighten three critical risks: great power conflict, loss of control of ASI systems, and the undermining of liberal democracy. Our analysis shows that ASI presents a trust dilemma rather than a prisoners dilemma, suggesting that international cooperation to control ASI development is both preferable and strategically sound. We conclude that cooperation is achievable. |
| title | The Manhattan Trap: Why a Race to Artificial Superintelligence is Self-Defeating |
| topic | Computers and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.14749 |