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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.19219 |
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| _version_ | 1866910807312302080 |
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| author | Pham, Mai Vaze, Vikrant Chin, Peter |
| author_facet | Pham, Mai Vaze, Vikrant Chin, Peter |
| contents | Differentiable economics, which uses neural networks as function approximators and gradient-based optimization in automated mechanism design (AMD), marked a significant breakthrough with the introduction of RegretNet \citep{regretnet_paper}. It combines the flexibility of deep learning with a regret-based approach to relax incentive compatibility, allowing for approximations of revenue-maximizing auctions. However, applying these techniques to combinatorial auctions (CAs) - where bidders value bundles rather than individual items, capturing item interdependencies - remains a challenge, primarily due to the lack of methodologies that can effectively deal with combinatorial constraints. To tackle this, we propose two architectures: CANet, a fully connected neural network, and CAFormer, a transformer-based model designed to learn optimal randomized mechanisms. Unlike existing methods in traditional AMD, our approach is more scalable and free of assumptions about the structures of allowable bundles or bidder valuations. We demonstrate that our models match current methods in non-combinatorial settings and set new benchmarks for CAs. Specifically, our models consistently outperform benchmark mechanisms derived from heuristic approaches and provide empirical solutions where analytical results are unavailable. This work bridges the gap in applying differentiable economics to combinatorial auctions, offering a scalable and flexible framework for designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_19219 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Advancing Differentiable Economics: A Neural Network Framework for Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms Pham, Mai Vaze, Vikrant Chin, Peter Computer Science and Game Theory Differentiable economics, which uses neural networks as function approximators and gradient-based optimization in automated mechanism design (AMD), marked a significant breakthrough with the introduction of RegretNet \citep{regretnet_paper}. It combines the flexibility of deep learning with a regret-based approach to relax incentive compatibility, allowing for approximations of revenue-maximizing auctions. However, applying these techniques to combinatorial auctions (CAs) - where bidders value bundles rather than individual items, capturing item interdependencies - remains a challenge, primarily due to the lack of methodologies that can effectively deal with combinatorial constraints. To tackle this, we propose two architectures: CANet, a fully connected neural network, and CAFormer, a transformer-based model designed to learn optimal randomized mechanisms. Unlike existing methods in traditional AMD, our approach is more scalable and free of assumptions about the structures of allowable bundles or bidder valuations. We demonstrate that our models match current methods in non-combinatorial settings and set new benchmarks for CAs. Specifically, our models consistently outperform benchmark mechanisms derived from heuristic approaches and provide empirical solutions where analytical results are unavailable. This work bridges the gap in applying differentiable economics to combinatorial auctions, offering a scalable and flexible framework for designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms. |
| title | Advancing Differentiable Economics: A Neural Network Framework for Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.19219 |