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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.00471 |
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| _version_ | 1866909635900866560 |
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| author | Chebotarev, Pavel |
| author_facet | Chebotarev, Pavel |
| contents | Decision-making societies may vary in their level of cooperation and degree of conservatism, both of which influence their overall performance. Moreover, these factors are not fixed -- they can change based on the decisions agents in the society make in their interests. But can these changes lead to cyclical patterns in societal evolution? To explore this question, we use the ViSE (Voting in Stochastic Environment) model. In this framework, the level of cooperation can be measured by group size, while the degree of conservatism is determined by the voting threshold. Agents can adopt either individualistic or group-oriented strategies when voting on stochastically generated external proposals. For Gaussian proposal generators, the expected capital gain (ECG) -- a measure of agents' performance -- can be expressed in standard mathematical functions. Our findings show that in neutral environments, societal evolution with open or democratic groups can follow cyclic patterns. We also find that highly conservative societies or conservative societies with low levels of cooperation can evolve into liberal (less conservative than majoritarian) societies and that mafia groups never let their members go when they want to. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_00471 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Evolution of Society Caused by Collective and Individual Decisions Chebotarev, Pavel Physics and Society Computer Science and Game Theory Optimization and Control 91B70, 91B12, 91B14, 91B15, 90C40 Decision-making societies may vary in their level of cooperation and degree of conservatism, both of which influence their overall performance. Moreover, these factors are not fixed -- they can change based on the decisions agents in the society make in their interests. But can these changes lead to cyclical patterns in societal evolution? To explore this question, we use the ViSE (Voting in Stochastic Environment) model. In this framework, the level of cooperation can be measured by group size, while the degree of conservatism is determined by the voting threshold. Agents can adopt either individualistic or group-oriented strategies when voting on stochastically generated external proposals. For Gaussian proposal generators, the expected capital gain (ECG) -- a measure of agents' performance -- can be expressed in standard mathematical functions. Our findings show that in neutral environments, societal evolution with open or democratic groups can follow cyclic patterns. We also find that highly conservative societies or conservative societies with low levels of cooperation can evolve into liberal (less conservative than majoritarian) societies and that mafia groups never let their members go when they want to. |
| title | Evolution of Society Caused by Collective and Individual Decisions |
| topic | Physics and Society Computer Science and Game Theory Optimization and Control 91B70, 91B12, 91B14, 91B15, 90C40 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.00471 |