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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.00970 |
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| _version_ | 1866916594907611136 |
|---|---|
| author | Abrams, Lawrence W. |
| author_facet | Abrams, Lawrence W. |
| contents | The exchange of rebates for formulary positions is conceptualized as a multi-round combinatorial position auction. This paper develops a linear assignment model of the winners' determination equation of this auction where the bases are net unit prices after unit rebates and expected demand. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_00970 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Market Design for Formulary Positions Abrams, Lawrence W. General Economics Economics The exchange of rebates for formulary positions is conceptualized as a multi-round combinatorial position auction. This paper develops a linear assignment model of the winners' determination equation of this auction where the bases are net unit prices after unit rebates and expected demand. |
| title | The Market Design for Formulary Positions |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.00970 |