The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913682669174784 |
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| author | Wu, Young Zhu, Yancheng Cai, Jin-Yi Zhu, Xiaojin |
| author_facet | Wu, Young Zhu, Yancheng Cai, Jin-Yi Zhu, Xiaojin |
| contents | When multiple influencers attempt to compete for a receiver's attention, their influencing strategies must account for the presence of one another. We introduce the Battling Influencers Game (BIG), a multi-player simultaneous-move general-sum game, to provide a game-theoretic characterization of this social phenomenon. We prove that BIG is a potential game, that it has either one or an infinite number of pure Nash equilibria (NEs), and these pure NEs can be found by convex optimization. Interestingly, we also prove that at any pure NE, all (except at most one) influencers must exaggerate their actions to the maximum extent. In other words, it is rational for the influencers to be non-truthful and extreme because they anticipate other influencers to cancel out part of their influence. We discuss the implications of BIG to value alignment. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_01127 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment Wu, Young Zhu, Yancheng Cai, Jin-Yi Zhu, Xiaojin Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence When multiple influencers attempt to compete for a receiver's attention, their influencing strategies must account for the presence of one another. We introduce the Battling Influencers Game (BIG), a multi-player simultaneous-move general-sum game, to provide a game-theoretic characterization of this social phenomenon. We prove that BIG is a potential game, that it has either one or an infinite number of pure Nash equilibria (NEs), and these pure NEs can be found by convex optimization. Interestingly, we also prove that at any pure NE, all (except at most one) influencers must exaggerate their actions to the maximum extent. In other words, it is rational for the influencers to be non-truthful and extreme because they anticipate other influencers to cancel out part of their influence. We discuss the implications of BIG to value alignment. |
| title | The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.01127 |