Cover Image

Signaling Design

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Camboni, Matteo, Niu, Mingzi, Pai, Mallesh M., Vohra, Rakesh
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Latency Advantages in Common-Value Auctions
by: Moallemi, Ciamac C., et al.
Published: (2025)

Centralization in Attester-Proposer Separation
by: Pai, Mallesh, et al.
Published: (2024)

SPARC: Staking Performance And Reward Coopetition
by: Norman, Michael D., et al.
Published: (2025)

Optimizing Exit Queues for Proof-of-Stake Blockchains: A Mechanism Design Approach
by: Neuder, Michael, et al.
Published: (2024)

Comparative Statics for Optimal Stopping Problems in Nonstationary Environments
by: Durandard, Théo, et al.
Published: (2024)

Prophet Inequalities via Linear Programming
by: Bayrak, Halil I., et al.
Published: (2026)

Optimal Bailouts in Diversified Financial Networks
by: Dasaratha, Krishna, et al.
Published: (2024)

Does Your Blockchain Need Multidimensional Transaction Fees?
by: Lavee, Nir, et al.
Published: (2025)

The Wisdom of the Crowd and Higher-Order Beliefs
by: Chen, Yi-Chun, et al.
Published: (2021)

Single-Peakedness Does Not Prevent Leapfrogging under Abstention
by: Ray, Aman, et al.
Published: (2026)

Signaling With Commitment
by: Boleslavsky, Raphael, et al.
Published: (2023)

Covert learning and disclosure
by: Escudé, Matteo
Published: (2023)

Multilateral Market Power in Input-Output Networks
by: Bizzarri, Matteo
Published: (2026)

Persuasive Selection in Signaling Games
by: Zeng, Haoyuan
Published: (2025)

Strong Dominance for Dynamic Signals
by: Whitmeyer, Mark, et al.
Published: (2024)

Pitfall of Precision in Noisy Signaling
by: Si, Shuhua, et al.
Published: (2026)

Multidimensional Signaling with a Resource Constraint
by: Han, Seungjin, et al.
Published: (2024)

Monotone Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Signaling
by: Han, Seungjin, et al.
Published: (2021)

Advising with Threshold Tests: Complexity, Signaling, and Effort
by: Lukyanov, Georgy, et al.
Published: (2025)

Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling
by: Starkov, Egor
Published: (2020)

Optimal Wage Band for Job Matching with Signaling
by: Han, Seungjin, et al.
Published: (2024)

Distributional Preferences for Market Design
by: Echenique, Federico, et al.
Published: (2026)

Market Design with Distributional Objectives
by: Hafalir, Isa E., et al.
Published: (2022)

The social value of overreaction to information
by: Bizzarri, Matteo, et al.
Published: (2024)

The Welfare Effects of Policy Signalling in a Regime Change Game
by: Lukyanov, Georgy
Published: (2025)

Endogenous Poverty Traps in Continuous Time: A Signaling Approach
by: Giannini, Massimo
Published: (2026)

Self-Employment as a Signal: Career Concerns with Hidden Firm Performance
by: Lukyanov, Georgy, et al.
Published: (2025)

Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2026)

Wealth dynamics in a multi-aggregate closed monetary system
by: Monaco, Andrea, et al.
Published: (2024)

Homophily and infections: static and dynamic effects
by: Bizzarri, Matteo, et al.
Published: (2023)

Persuasion in Networks: Can the Sender Do Better than Using Public Signals?
by: Zhang, Yifan
Published: (2024)

Calibrated Mechanism Design
by: Doval, Laura, et al.
Published: (2025)

Optimal Platform Design
by: Wittbrodt, Cole
Published: (2025)

Dynamic Reward Design
by: Liu, Yijun
Published: (2025)

Coarse Information Design
by: Lyu, Qianjun, et al.
Published: (2023)

Dynamic Market Design
by: Che, Yeon-Koo
Published: (2026)

Designing Social Learning
by: Smirnov, Aleksei, et al.
Published: (2024)

From Design to Disclosure
by: Ali, S. Nageeb, et al.
Published: (2024)

Sequential Network Design
by: Sun, Yang, et al.
Published: (2024)

The Design and Price of Influence
by: Boleslavsky, Raphael, et al.
Published: (2024)