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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.02335 |
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| _version_ | 1866915141247827968 |
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| author | Lai, Anthony Cheuk Tung Kamluk, Vitaly Ho, Alan Ke, Ping Fan Wai, Byron |
| author_facet | Lai, Anthony Cheuk Tung Kamluk, Vitaly Ho, Alan Ke, Ping Fan Wai, Byron |
| contents | Backdoor Malware are installed by an attacker on the victim's server(s) for authorized access. A customized backdoor is weaponized to execute unauthorized system, database and application commands to access the user credentials and confidential digital assets. Recently, we discovered and analyzed a targeted persistent module backdoor in Web Server in an online business company that was undetectable by their deployed Anti-Virus software for a year. This led us to carry out research to detect this specific type of persistent module backdoor installed in Web servers. Other than typical Malware static analysis, we carry out analysis with binary similarity, strings, and command obfuscation over the backdoor, resulting in the Target Attack Backdoor Malware Analysis Matrix (TABMAX) for organizations to detect this sophisticated target attack backdoor instead of a general one which can be detected by Anti-Virus detectors. Our findings show that backdoor malware can be designed with different APIs, commands, strings, and query language on top of preferred libraries used by typical Malware. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_02335 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Target Attack Backdoor Malware Analysis and Attribution Lai, Anthony Cheuk Tung Kamluk, Vitaly Ho, Alan Ke, Ping Fan Wai, Byron Cryptography and Security Backdoor Malware are installed by an attacker on the victim's server(s) for authorized access. A customized backdoor is weaponized to execute unauthorized system, database and application commands to access the user credentials and confidential digital assets. Recently, we discovered and analyzed a targeted persistent module backdoor in Web Server in an online business company that was undetectable by their deployed Anti-Virus software for a year. This led us to carry out research to detect this specific type of persistent module backdoor installed in Web servers. Other than typical Malware static analysis, we carry out analysis with binary similarity, strings, and command obfuscation over the backdoor, resulting in the Target Attack Backdoor Malware Analysis Matrix (TABMAX) for organizations to detect this sophisticated target attack backdoor instead of a general one which can be detected by Anti-Virus detectors. Our findings show that backdoor malware can be designed with different APIs, commands, strings, and query language on top of preferred libraries used by typical Malware. |
| title | Target Attack Backdoor Malware Analysis and Attribution |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.02335 |