SoK: Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks and Defenses in Federated Learning
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915141422940160 |
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| author | Zhang, Heyi Liu, Yule He, Xinlei Wu, Jun Cong, Tianshuo Huang, Xinyi |
| author_facet | Zhang, Heyi Liu, Yule He, Xinlei Wu, Jun Cong, Tianshuo Huang, Xinyi |
| contents | Federated learning (FL) enables collaborative model training while preserving data privacy, but its decentralized nature exposes it to client-side data poisoning attacks (DPAs) and model poisoning attacks (MPAs) that degrade global model performance. While numerous proposed defenses claim substantial effectiveness, their evaluation is typically done in isolation with limited attack strategies, raising concerns about their validity. Additionally, existing studies overlook the mutual effectiveness of defenses against both DPAs and MPAs, causing fragmentation in this field. This paper aims to provide a unified benchmark and analysis of defenses against DPAs and MPAs, clarifying the distinction between these two similar but slightly distinct domains. We present a systematic taxonomy of poisoning attacks and defense strategies, outlining their design, strengths, and limitations. Then, a unified comparative evaluation across FL algorithms and data heterogeneity is conducted to validate their individual and mutual effectiveness and derive key insights for design principles and future research. Along with the analysis, we frame our work to a unified benchmark, FLPoison, with high modularity and scalability to evaluate 15 representative poisoning attacks and 17 defense strategies, facilitating future research in this domain. Code is available at https://github.com/vio1etus/FLPoison. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_03801 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | SoK: Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks and Defenses in Federated Learning Zhang, Heyi Liu, Yule He, Xinlei Wu, Jun Cong, Tianshuo Huang, Xinyi Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning Federated learning (FL) enables collaborative model training while preserving data privacy, but its decentralized nature exposes it to client-side data poisoning attacks (DPAs) and model poisoning attacks (MPAs) that degrade global model performance. While numerous proposed defenses claim substantial effectiveness, their evaluation is typically done in isolation with limited attack strategies, raising concerns about their validity. Additionally, existing studies overlook the mutual effectiveness of defenses against both DPAs and MPAs, causing fragmentation in this field. This paper aims to provide a unified benchmark and analysis of defenses against DPAs and MPAs, clarifying the distinction between these two similar but slightly distinct domains. We present a systematic taxonomy of poisoning attacks and defense strategies, outlining their design, strengths, and limitations. Then, a unified comparative evaluation across FL algorithms and data heterogeneity is conducted to validate their individual and mutual effectiveness and derive key insights for design principles and future research. Along with the analysis, we frame our work to a unified benchmark, FLPoison, with high modularity and scalability to evaluate 15 representative poisoning attacks and 17 defense strategies, facilitating future research in this domain. Code is available at https://github.com/vio1etus/FLPoison. |
| title | SoK: Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks and Defenses in Federated Learning |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.03801 |