A Critical Analysis of Deployed Use Cases for Quantum Key Distribution and Comparison with Post-Quantum Cryptography
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866908351203377152 |
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| author | Aquina, Nick Cimoli, Bruno Das, Soumya Hövelmanns, Kathrin Weber, Fiona Johanna Okonkwo, Chigo Rommel, Simon Škorić, Boris Monroy, Idelfonso Tafur Verschoor, Sebastian |
| author_facet | Aquina, Nick Cimoli, Bruno Das, Soumya Hövelmanns, Kathrin Weber, Fiona Johanna Okonkwo, Chigo Rommel, Simon Škorić, Boris Monroy, Idelfonso Tafur Verschoor, Sebastian |
| contents | Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is currently being discussed as a technology to safeguard communication in a future where quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive security evaluation of QKD-based solutions, focusing on real-world use cases sourced from academic literature and industry reports. We analyze these use cases, assess their security and identify the possible advantages of deploying QKD-based solutions. We further compare QKD-based solutions with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), the alternative approach to achieving security when quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems, evaluating their respective suitability for each scenario. Based on this comparative analysis, we critically discuss and comment on which use cases QKD is suited for, considering factors such as implementation complexity, scalability, and long-term security. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the role QKD could play in future cryptographic infrastructures and offer guidance to decision-makers considering the deployment of QKD. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_04009 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Critical Analysis of Deployed Use Cases for Quantum Key Distribution and Comparison with Post-Quantum Cryptography Aquina, Nick Cimoli, Bruno Das, Soumya Hövelmanns, Kathrin Weber, Fiona Johanna Okonkwo, Chigo Rommel, Simon Škorić, Boris Monroy, Idelfonso Tafur Verschoor, Sebastian Cryptography and Security Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is currently being discussed as a technology to safeguard communication in a future where quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive security evaluation of QKD-based solutions, focusing on real-world use cases sourced from academic literature and industry reports. We analyze these use cases, assess their security and identify the possible advantages of deploying QKD-based solutions. We further compare QKD-based solutions with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), the alternative approach to achieving security when quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems, evaluating their respective suitability for each scenario. Based on this comparative analysis, we critically discuss and comment on which use cases QKD is suited for, considering factors such as implementation complexity, scalability, and long-term security. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the role QKD could play in future cryptographic infrastructures and offer guidance to decision-makers considering the deployment of QKD. |
| title | A Critical Analysis of Deployed Use Cases for Quantum Key Distribution and Comparison with Post-Quantum Cryptography |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.04009 |