From Counterfactuals to Trees: Competitive Analysis of Model Extraction Attacks

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Khouna, Awa, Ferry, Julien, Vidal, Thibaut
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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author Khouna, Awa
Ferry, Julien
Vidal, Thibaut
author_facet Khouna, Awa
Ferry, Julien
Vidal, Thibaut
contents The advent of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) has heightened the trade-off between model explainability and security. In particular, explainability techniques, such as counterfactual explanations, inadvertently increase the risk of model extraction attacks, enabling unauthorized replication of proprietary models. In this paper, we formalize and characterize the risks and inherent complexity of model reconstruction, focusing on the "oracle'' queries required for faithfully inferring the underlying prediction function. We present the first formal analysis of model extraction attacks through the lens of competitive analysis, establishing a foundational framework to evaluate their efficiency. Focusing on models based on additive decision trees (e.g., decision trees, gradient boosting, and random forests), we introduce novel reconstruction algorithms that achieve provably perfect fidelity while demonstrating strong anytime performance. Our framework provides theoretical bounds on the query complexity for extracting tree-based model, offering new insights into the security vulnerabilities of their deployment.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_05325
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle From Counterfactuals to Trees: Competitive Analysis of Model Extraction Attacks
Khouna, Awa
Ferry, Julien
Vidal, Thibaut
Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
The advent of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) has heightened the trade-off between model explainability and security. In particular, explainability techniques, such as counterfactual explanations, inadvertently increase the risk of model extraction attacks, enabling unauthorized replication of proprietary models. In this paper, we formalize and characterize the risks and inherent complexity of model reconstruction, focusing on the "oracle'' queries required for faithfully inferring the underlying prediction function. We present the first formal analysis of model extraction attacks through the lens of competitive analysis, establishing a foundational framework to evaluate their efficiency. Focusing on models based on additive decision trees (e.g., decision trees, gradient boosting, and random forests), we introduce novel reconstruction algorithms that achieve provably perfect fidelity while demonstrating strong anytime performance. Our framework provides theoretical bounds on the query complexity for extracting tree-based model, offering new insights into the security vulnerabilities of their deployment.
title From Counterfactuals to Trees: Competitive Analysis of Model Extraction Attacks
topic Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.05325