Riemannian Manifold Learning for Stackelberg Games with Neural Flow Representations

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Liu, Larkin, Rasul, Kashif, Chao, Yutong, Etesami, Jalal
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Liu, Larkin
Rasul, Kashif
Chao, Yutong
Etesami, Jalal
author_facet Liu, Larkin
Rasul, Kashif
Chao, Yutong
Etesami, Jalal
contents We present a novel framework for online learning in Stackelberg general-sum games, where two agents, the leader and follower, engage in sequential turn-based interactions. At the core of this approach is a learned diffeomorphism that maps the joint action space to a smooth spherical Riemannian manifold, referred to as the Stackelberg manifold. This mapping, facilitated by neural normalizing flows, ensures the formation of tractable isoplanar subspaces, enabling efficient techniques for online learning. Leveraging the linearity of the agents' reward functions on the Stackelberg manifold, our construct allows the application of linear bandit algorithms. We then provide a rigorous theoretical basis for regret minimization on the learned manifold and establish bounds on the simple regret for learning Stackelberg equilibrium. This integration of manifold learning into game theory uncovers a previously unrecognized potential for neural normalizing flows as an effective tool for multi-agent learning. We present empirical results demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach compared to standard baselines, with applications spanning domains such as cybersecurity and economic supply chain optimization.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_05498
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Riemannian Manifold Learning for Stackelberg Games with Neural Flow Representations
Liu, Larkin
Rasul, Kashif
Chao, Yutong
Etesami, Jalal
Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Computer Science and Game Theory
Multiagent Systems
91A10
I.2.6; I.2.11
We present a novel framework for online learning in Stackelberg general-sum games, where two agents, the leader and follower, engage in sequential turn-based interactions. At the core of this approach is a learned diffeomorphism that maps the joint action space to a smooth spherical Riemannian manifold, referred to as the Stackelberg manifold. This mapping, facilitated by neural normalizing flows, ensures the formation of tractable isoplanar subspaces, enabling efficient techniques for online learning. Leveraging the linearity of the agents' reward functions on the Stackelberg manifold, our construct allows the application of linear bandit algorithms. We then provide a rigorous theoretical basis for regret minimization on the learned manifold and establish bounds on the simple regret for learning Stackelberg equilibrium. This integration of manifold learning into game theory uncovers a previously unrecognized potential for neural normalizing flows as an effective tool for multi-agent learning. We present empirical results demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach compared to standard baselines, with applications spanning domains such as cybersecurity and economic supply chain optimization.
title Riemannian Manifold Learning for Stackelberg Games with Neural Flow Representations
topic Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Computer Science and Game Theory
Multiagent Systems
91A10
I.2.6; I.2.11
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.05498