Online Bidding Algorithms with Strict Return on Spend (ROS) Constraint

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Vaze, Rahul, Sinha, Abhishek
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Vaze, Rahul
Sinha, Abhishek
author_facet Vaze, Rahul
Sinha, Abhishek
contents Auto-bidding problem under a strict return-on-spend constraint (ROSC) is considered, where an algorithm has to make decisions about how much to bid for an ad slot depending on the revealed value, and the hidden allocation and payment function that describes the probability of winning the ad-slot depending on its bid. The objective of an algorithm is to maximize the expected utility (product of ad value and probability of winning the ad slot) summed across all time slots subject to the total expected payment being less than the total expected utility, called the ROSC. A (surprising) impossibility result is derived that shows that no online algorithm can achieve a sub-linear regret even when the value, allocation and payment function are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution. The problem is non-trivial even when the revealed value remains constant across time slots, and an algorithm with regret guarantee that is optimal up to logarithmic factor is derived.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_05599
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Online Bidding Algorithms with Strict Return on Spend (ROS) Constraint
Vaze, Rahul
Sinha, Abhishek
Computer Science and Game Theory
Data Structures and Algorithms
Machine Learning
Auto-bidding problem under a strict return-on-spend constraint (ROSC) is considered, where an algorithm has to make decisions about how much to bid for an ad slot depending on the revealed value, and the hidden allocation and payment function that describes the probability of winning the ad-slot depending on its bid. The objective of an algorithm is to maximize the expected utility (product of ad value and probability of winning the ad slot) summed across all time slots subject to the total expected payment being less than the total expected utility, called the ROSC. A (surprising) impossibility result is derived that shows that no online algorithm can achieve a sub-linear regret even when the value, allocation and payment function are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution. The problem is non-trivial even when the revealed value remains constant across time slots, and an algorithm with regret guarantee that is optimal up to logarithmic factor is derived.
title Online Bidding Algorithms with Strict Return on Spend (ROS) Constraint
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Data Structures and Algorithms
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.05599