Strategic Queues with Priority Classes
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866916605757227008 |
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| author | D'Andrea, Maurizio Scarsini, Marco |
| author_facet | D'Andrea, Maurizio Scarsini, Marco |
| contents | We consider a strategic M/M/1 queueing model under a first-come-first-served regime, where customers are split into two classes and class $A$ has priority over class $B$. Customers can decide whether to join the queue or balk, and, in case they have joined the queue, whether and when to renege. We study the equilibrium strategies and compare the equilibrium outcome and the social optimum in the two cases where the social optimum is or is not constrained by priority. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_05906 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic Queues with Priority Classes D'Andrea, Maurizio Scarsini, Marco Computer Science and Game Theory Probability 90B22 (Primary) 91A25, 91A80, 60K25 (Secondary) We consider a strategic M/M/1 queueing model under a first-come-first-served regime, where customers are split into two classes and class $A$ has priority over class $B$. Customers can decide whether to join the queue or balk, and, in case they have joined the queue, whether and when to renege. We study the equilibrium strategies and compare the equilibrium outcome and the social optimum in the two cases where the social optimum is or is not constrained by priority. |
| title | Strategic Queues with Priority Classes |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Probability 90B22 (Primary) 91A25, 91A80, 60K25 (Secondary) |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.05906 |