The AI Security Zugzwang
Fuente:
arXiv
Enregistré dans:
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
|
| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | |
| Tags: |
Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
| _version_ | 1866912536650055680 |
|---|---|
| author | Alevizos, Lampis |
| author_facet | Alevizos, Lampis |
| contents | In chess, zugzwang describes a scenario where any move worsens the player's position. Organizations face a similar dilemma right now at the intersection of artificial intelligence (AI) and cybersecurity. AI adoption creates an inevitable paradox: delaying it poses strategic risks, rushing it introduces poorly understood vulnerabilities, and even incremental adoption leads to cascading complexities. In this work we formalize this challenge as the AI Security Zugzwang, a phenomenon where security leaders must make decisions under conditions of inevitable risk. Grounded in game theory, security economics, and organizational decision theory, we characterize AI security zugzwang through three key properties, the forced movement, predictable vulnerability creation, and temporal pressure. Additionally, we develop a taxonomy to categorize forced-move scenarios across AI adoption, implementation, operational and governance contexts and provide corresponding strategic mitigations. Our framework is supported by a practical decision flowchart, demonstrated through a real-world example of Copilot adoption, thus, showing how security lead |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_06000 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The AI Security Zugzwang Alevizos, Lampis Cryptography and Security In chess, zugzwang describes a scenario where any move worsens the player's position. Organizations face a similar dilemma right now at the intersection of artificial intelligence (AI) and cybersecurity. AI adoption creates an inevitable paradox: delaying it poses strategic risks, rushing it introduces poorly understood vulnerabilities, and even incremental adoption leads to cascading complexities. In this work we formalize this challenge as the AI Security Zugzwang, a phenomenon where security leaders must make decisions under conditions of inevitable risk. Grounded in game theory, security economics, and organizational decision theory, we characterize AI security zugzwang through three key properties, the forced movement, predictable vulnerability creation, and temporal pressure. Additionally, we develop a taxonomy to categorize forced-move scenarios across AI adoption, implementation, operational and governance contexts and provide corresponding strategic mitigations. Our framework is supported by a practical decision flowchart, demonstrated through a real-world example of Copilot adoption, thus, showing how security lead |
| title | The AI Security Zugzwang |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.06000 |