Perpetual Demand Lending Pools
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908379791753216 |
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| author | Chitra, Tarun Diamandis, Theo Sheng, Nathan Sterle, Luke Yusubov, Kamil |
| author_facet | Chitra, Tarun Diamandis, Theo Sheng, Nathan Sterle, Luke Yusubov, Kamil |
| contents | Decentralized perpetuals protocols have collectively reached billions of dollars of daily trading volume, yet are still not serious competitors on the basis of trading volume with centralized venues such as Binance. One of the main reasons for this is the high cost of capital for market makers and sophisticated traders in decentralized settings. Recently, numerous decentralized finance protocols have been used to improve borrowing costs for perpetual futures traders. We formalize this class of mechanisms utilized by protocols such as Jupiter, Hyperliquid, and GMX, which we term~\emph{Perpetual Demand Lending Pools} (PDLPs). We then formalize a general target weight mechanism that generalizes what GMX and Jupiter are using in practice. We explicitly describe pool arbitrage and expected payoffs for arbitrageurs and liquidity providers within these mechanisms. Using this framework, we show that under general conditions, PDLPs are easy to delta hedge, partially explaining the proliferation of live hedged PDLP strategies. Our results suggest directions to improve capital efficiency in PDLPs via dynamic parametrization. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_06028 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Perpetual Demand Lending Pools Chitra, Tarun Diamandis, Theo Sheng, Nathan Sterle, Luke Yusubov, Kamil Computer Science and Game Theory Portfolio Management Risk Management Decentralized perpetuals protocols have collectively reached billions of dollars of daily trading volume, yet are still not serious competitors on the basis of trading volume with centralized venues such as Binance. One of the main reasons for this is the high cost of capital for market makers and sophisticated traders in decentralized settings. Recently, numerous decentralized finance protocols have been used to improve borrowing costs for perpetual futures traders. We formalize this class of mechanisms utilized by protocols such as Jupiter, Hyperliquid, and GMX, which we term~\emph{Perpetual Demand Lending Pools} (PDLPs). We then formalize a general target weight mechanism that generalizes what GMX and Jupiter are using in practice. We explicitly describe pool arbitrage and expected payoffs for arbitrageurs and liquidity providers within these mechanisms. Using this framework, we show that under general conditions, PDLPs are easy to delta hedge, partially explaining the proliferation of live hedged PDLP strategies. Our results suggest directions to improve capital efficiency in PDLPs via dynamic parametrization. |
| title | Perpetual Demand Lending Pools |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Portfolio Management Risk Management |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.06028 |