Liquid Welfare and Revenue Monotonicity in Adaptive Clinching Auctions
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | Sato, Ryosuke |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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