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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.06662 |
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| _version_ | 1866915144774189056 |
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| author | He, Hao Vasilescu, Bogdan Kästner, Christian |
| author_facet | He, Hao Vasilescu, Bogdan Kästner, Christian |
| contents | Recent high-profile incidents in open-source software have greatly raised practitioner attention on software supply chain attacks. To guard against potential malicious package updates, security practitioners advocate pinning dependency to specific versions rather than floating in version ranges. However, it remains controversial whether pinning carries a meaningful security benefit that outweighs the cost of maintaining outdated and possibly vulnerable dependencies. In this paper, we quantify, through counterfactual analysis and simulations, the security and maintenance impact of version constraints in the npm ecosystem. By simulating dependency resolutions over historical time points, we find that pinning direct dependencies not only (as expected) increases the cost of maintaining vulnerable and outdated dependencies, but also (surprisingly) even increases the risk of exposure to malicious package updates in larger dependency graphs due to the specifics of npm's dependency resolution mechanism. Finally, we explore collective pinning strategies to secure the ecosystem against supply chain attacks, suggesting specific changes to npm to enable such interventions. Our study provides guidance for practitioners and tool designers to manage their supply chains more securely. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_06662 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Pinning Is Futile: You Need More Than Local Dependency Versioning to Defend against Supply Chain Attacks He, Hao Vasilescu, Bogdan Kästner, Christian Software Engineering Cryptography and Security Recent high-profile incidents in open-source software have greatly raised practitioner attention on software supply chain attacks. To guard against potential malicious package updates, security practitioners advocate pinning dependency to specific versions rather than floating in version ranges. However, it remains controversial whether pinning carries a meaningful security benefit that outweighs the cost of maintaining outdated and possibly vulnerable dependencies. In this paper, we quantify, through counterfactual analysis and simulations, the security and maintenance impact of version constraints in the npm ecosystem. By simulating dependency resolutions over historical time points, we find that pinning direct dependencies not only (as expected) increases the cost of maintaining vulnerable and outdated dependencies, but also (surprisingly) even increases the risk of exposure to malicious package updates in larger dependency graphs due to the specifics of npm's dependency resolution mechanism. Finally, we explore collective pinning strategies to secure the ecosystem against supply chain attacks, suggesting specific changes to npm to enable such interventions. Our study provides guidance for practitioners and tool designers to manage their supply chains more securely. |
| title | Pinning Is Futile: You Need More Than Local Dependency Versioning to Defend against Supply Chain Attacks |
| topic | Software Engineering Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.06662 |