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| Autori principali: | , , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.06892 |
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| _version_ | 1866912228255465472 |
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| author | He, Bowei Yin, Lihao Zhen, Hui-Ling Zhang, Jianping Hong, Lanqing Yuan, Mingxuan Ma, Chen |
| author_facet | He, Bowei Yin, Lihao Zhen, Hui-Ling Zhang, Jianping Hong, Lanqing Yuan, Mingxuan Ma, Chen |
| contents | The widespread deployment of pre-trained language models (PLMs) has exposed them to textual backdoor attacks, particularly those planted during the pre-training stage. These attacks pose significant risks to high-reliability applications, as they can stealthily affect multiple downstream tasks. While certifying robustness against such threats is crucial, existing defenses struggle with the high-dimensional, interdependent nature of textual data and the lack of access to original poisoned pre-training data. To address these challenges, we introduce \textbf{F}uzzed \textbf{R}andomized \textbf{S}moothing (\textbf{FRS}), a novel approach for efficiently certifying language model robustness against backdoor attacks. FRS integrates software robustness certification techniques with biphased model parameter smoothing, employing Monte Carlo tree search for proactive fuzzing to identify vulnerable textual segments within the Damerau-Levenshtein space. This allows for targeted and efficient text randomization, while eliminating the need for access to poisoned training data during model smoothing. Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that FRS achieves a broader certified robustness radius compared to existing methods. Extensive experiments across various datasets, model configurations, and attack strategies validate FRS's superiority in terms of defense efficiency, accuracy, and robustness. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_06892 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Certifying Language Model Robustness with Fuzzed Randomized Smoothing: An Efficient Defense Against Backdoor Attacks He, Bowei Yin, Lihao Zhen, Hui-Ling Zhang, Jianping Hong, Lanqing Yuan, Mingxuan Ma, Chen Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence The widespread deployment of pre-trained language models (PLMs) has exposed them to textual backdoor attacks, particularly those planted during the pre-training stage. These attacks pose significant risks to high-reliability applications, as they can stealthily affect multiple downstream tasks. While certifying robustness against such threats is crucial, existing defenses struggle with the high-dimensional, interdependent nature of textual data and the lack of access to original poisoned pre-training data. To address these challenges, we introduce \textbf{F}uzzed \textbf{R}andomized \textbf{S}moothing (\textbf{FRS}), a novel approach for efficiently certifying language model robustness against backdoor attacks. FRS integrates software robustness certification techniques with biphased model parameter smoothing, employing Monte Carlo tree search for proactive fuzzing to identify vulnerable textual segments within the Damerau-Levenshtein space. This allows for targeted and efficient text randomization, while eliminating the need for access to poisoned training data during model smoothing. Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that FRS achieves a broader certified robustness radius compared to existing methods. Extensive experiments across various datasets, model configurations, and attack strategies validate FRS's superiority in terms of defense efficiency, accuracy, and robustness. |
| title | Certifying Language Model Robustness with Fuzzed Randomized Smoothing: An Efficient Defense Against Backdoor Attacks |
| topic | Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.06892 |