A deterministic electoral system satisfying Arrow's four conditions in an easily approached limit

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1. Verfasser: Sewell, Roger F.
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Sewell, Roger F.
author_facet Sewell, Roger F.
contents In 1950 Arrow famously showed that there is no social welfare function satisfying four basic conditions. In 1976, on the other hand, Gibbard and Sonnenschein showed that there does exist a unique probabilistic social welfare method that satisfies a different set of strictly stronger conditions. In this paper we discuss a deterministic electoral method satisfying those same stronger conditions in an appropriate sense; it is not a counterexample to either of these theorems. We attach a simple reference implementation written in C with executables for Linux and Windows.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_07444
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle A deterministic electoral system satisfying Arrow's four conditions in an easily approached limit
Sewell, Roger F.
Theoretical Economics
91B14
In 1950 Arrow famously showed that there is no social welfare function satisfying four basic conditions. In 1976, on the other hand, Gibbard and Sonnenschein showed that there does exist a unique probabilistic social welfare method that satisfies a different set of strictly stronger conditions. In this paper we discuss a deterministic electoral method satisfying those same stronger conditions in an appropriate sense; it is not a counterexample to either of these theorems. We attach a simple reference implementation written in C with executables for Linux and Windows.
title A deterministic electoral system satisfying Arrow's four conditions in an easily approached limit
topic Theoretical Economics
91B14
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.07444