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Auteurs principaux: Barrientos, Benjamin, Freund, Daniel, Saban, Daniela
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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Accès en ligne:https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.07731
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author Barrientos, Benjamin
Freund, Daniel
Saban, Daniela
author_facet Barrientos, Benjamin
Freund, Daniel
Saban, Daniela
contents Our work introduces the effect of supply/demand imbalances into the literature on online matching with stochastic rewards in bipartite graphs. We provide a parameterized definition that characterizes instances as over- or undersupplied (or balanced), and show that higher competitive ratios against an offline clairvoyant algorithm are achievable, for both adversarial and stochastic arrivals, when instances are more imbalanced. The competitive ratio guarantees we obtain are the best-possible for the class of delayed algorithms we focus on (such algorithms may adapt to the history of arrivals and the algorithm's own decisions, but not to the stochastic realization of each potential match). We then explore the real-world implications of our improved competitive ratios. First, we demonstrate analytically that the improved competitive ratios under imbalanced instances is not a one-way street by showing that a platform that conducts effective supply- and demand management should incorporate the effect of imbalance on its matching performance on its supply planning in order to create imbalanced instances. Second, we empirically study the relationship between achieved competitive ratios and imbalance using the data of a volunteer matching platform.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_07731
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Online matching and market imbalance
Barrientos, Benjamin
Freund, Daniel
Saban, Daniela
Data Structures and Algorithms
Optimization and Control
F.2.2
Our work introduces the effect of supply/demand imbalances into the literature on online matching with stochastic rewards in bipartite graphs. We provide a parameterized definition that characterizes instances as over- or undersupplied (or balanced), and show that higher competitive ratios against an offline clairvoyant algorithm are achievable, for both adversarial and stochastic arrivals, when instances are more imbalanced. The competitive ratio guarantees we obtain are the best-possible for the class of delayed algorithms we focus on (such algorithms may adapt to the history of arrivals and the algorithm's own decisions, but not to the stochastic realization of each potential match). We then explore the real-world implications of our improved competitive ratios. First, we demonstrate analytically that the improved competitive ratios under imbalanced instances is not a one-way street by showing that a platform that conducts effective supply- and demand management should incorporate the effect of imbalance on its matching performance on its supply planning in order to create imbalanced instances. Second, we empirically study the relationship between achieved competitive ratios and imbalance using the data of a volunteer matching platform.
title Online matching and market imbalance
topic Data Structures and Algorithms
Optimization and Control
F.2.2
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.07731