Future Resource Bank for ISAC: Achieving Fast and Stable Win-Win Matching for Both Individuals and Coalitions

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Main Authors: Qi, Houyi, Liwang, Minghui, Hosseinalipour, Seyyedali, Fu, Liqun, Zou, Sai, Ni, Wei
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Qi, Houyi
Liwang, Minghui
Hosseinalipour, Seyyedali
Fu, Liqun
Zou, Sai
Ni, Wei
author_facet Qi, Houyi
Liwang, Minghui
Hosseinalipour, Seyyedali
Fu, Liqun
Zou, Sai
Ni, Wei
contents Future wireless networks must support emerging applications where environmental awareness is as critical as data transmission. Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC) enables this vision by allowing base stations (BSs) to allocate bandwidth and power to mobile users (MUs) for communications and cooperative sensing. However, this resource allocation is highly challenging due to: (i) dynamic resource demands from MUs and resource supply from BSs, and (ii) the selfishness of MUs and BSs. To address these challenges, existing solutions rely on either real-time (online) resource trading, which incurs high overhead and failures, or static long-term (offline) resource contracts, which lack flexibility. To overcome these limitations, we propose the Future Resource Bank for ISAC, a hybrid trading framework that integrates offline and online resource allocation through a level-wise client model, where MUs and their coalitions negotiate with BSs. We introduce two mechanisms: (i) Role-Friendly Win-Win Matching (offRFW$^2$M), leveraging overbooking to establish risk-aware, stable contracts, and (ii) Effective Backup Win-Win Matching (onEBW$^2$M), which dynamically reallocates unmet demand and surplus supply. We theoretically prove stability, individual rationality, and weak Pareto optimality of these mechanisms. Through simulations, we show that our framework improves social welfare, latency, and energy efficiency compared to existing methods.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_08118
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Future Resource Bank for ISAC: Achieving Fast and Stable Win-Win Matching for Both Individuals and Coalitions
Qi, Houyi
Liwang, Minghui
Hosseinalipour, Seyyedali
Fu, Liqun
Zou, Sai
Ni, Wei
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Networking and Internet Architecture
Future wireless networks must support emerging applications where environmental awareness is as critical as data transmission. Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC) enables this vision by allowing base stations (BSs) to allocate bandwidth and power to mobile users (MUs) for communications and cooperative sensing. However, this resource allocation is highly challenging due to: (i) dynamic resource demands from MUs and resource supply from BSs, and (ii) the selfishness of MUs and BSs. To address these challenges, existing solutions rely on either real-time (online) resource trading, which incurs high overhead and failures, or static long-term (offline) resource contracts, which lack flexibility. To overcome these limitations, we propose the Future Resource Bank for ISAC, a hybrid trading framework that integrates offline and online resource allocation through a level-wise client model, where MUs and their coalitions negotiate with BSs. We introduce two mechanisms: (i) Role-Friendly Win-Win Matching (offRFW$^2$M), leveraging overbooking to establish risk-aware, stable contracts, and (ii) Effective Backup Win-Win Matching (onEBW$^2$M), which dynamically reallocates unmet demand and surplus supply. We theoretically prove stability, individual rationality, and weak Pareto optimality of these mechanisms. Through simulations, we show that our framework improves social welfare, latency, and energy efficiency compared to existing methods.
title Future Resource Bank for ISAC: Achieving Fast and Stable Win-Win Matching for Both Individuals and Coalitions
topic Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Networking and Internet Architecture
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.08118