Renegotiation-Proof Cheap Talk

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Kivinen, Steven, Kuzmics, Christoph
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2025
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author Kivinen, Steven
Kuzmics, Christoph
author_facet Kivinen, Steven
Kuzmics, Christoph
contents An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect equilibrium, no payoff profile close to the Decision-Maker's optimal one is immune to renegotiation. Pareto efficient renegotiation-proof equilibria entail a compromise between the Advisor and the Decision-Maker. This could involve the Advisor being truthful and the Decision-Maker not fully utilizing this information to their advantage, or the Advisor exaggerating the truth and the Decision-Maker pretending to believe them.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_08296
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Renegotiation-Proof Cheap Talk
Kivinen, Steven
Kuzmics, Christoph
Theoretical Economics
An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect equilibrium, no payoff profile close to the Decision-Maker's optimal one is immune to renegotiation. Pareto efficient renegotiation-proof equilibria entail a compromise between the Advisor and the Decision-Maker. This could involve the Advisor being truthful and the Decision-Maker not fully utilizing this information to their advantage, or the Advisor exaggerating the truth and the Decision-Maker pretending to believe them.
title Renegotiation-Proof Cheap Talk
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.08296