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Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Dai, Yan, Blanchard, Moise, Jaillet, Patrick
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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