U Can Touch This! Microarchitectural Timing Attacks via Machine Clears
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866917922793848832 |
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| author | Brumley, Billy Bob |
| author_facet | Brumley, Billy Bob |
| contents | Microarchitectural timing attacks exploit subtle timing variations caused by hardware behaviors to leak sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce MCHammer, a novel side-channel technique that leverages machine clears induced by self-modifying code detection mechanisms. Unlike most traditional techniques, MCHammer does not require memory access or waiting periods, making it highly efficient. We compare MCHammer to the classical Flush+Reload technique, improving in terms of trace granularity, providing a powerful side-channel attack vector. Using MCHammer, we successfully recover keys from a deployed implementation of a cryptographic tool. Our findings highlight the practical implications of MCHammer and its potential impact on real-world systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_09864 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | U Can Touch This! Microarchitectural Timing Attacks via Machine Clears Brumley, Billy Bob Cryptography and Security Microarchitectural timing attacks exploit subtle timing variations caused by hardware behaviors to leak sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce MCHammer, a novel side-channel technique that leverages machine clears induced by self-modifying code detection mechanisms. Unlike most traditional techniques, MCHammer does not require memory access or waiting periods, making it highly efficient. We compare MCHammer to the classical Flush+Reload technique, improving in terms of trace granularity, providing a powerful side-channel attack vector. Using MCHammer, we successfully recover keys from a deployed implementation of a cryptographic tool. Our findings highlight the practical implications of MCHammer and its potential impact on real-world systems. |
| title | U Can Touch This! Microarchitectural Timing Attacks via Machine Clears |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.09864 |