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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Hashimoto, Kento, Kuwahara, Keita, Nonaka, Reo
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2025
Materias:	Theoretical Economics
Acceso en línea:	https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.10086
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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