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On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Ron, Shiri, Schoepflin, Daniel
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2025
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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