Monotonicity and Bracketing in Games
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
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| _version_ | 1866912609163280384 |
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| author | Sandomirskiy, Fedor Sung, Po Hyun Tamuz, Omer Wincelberg, Ben |
| author_facet | Sandomirskiy, Fedor Sung, Po Hyun Tamuz, Omer Wincelberg, Ben |
| contents | We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are responsive to payoffs induced by the play of others and, whenever several games are played simultaneously, players may consider each separately. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_11243 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Monotonicity and Bracketing in Games Sandomirskiy, Fedor Sung, Po Hyun Tamuz, Omer Wincelberg, Ben Theoretical Economics We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are responsive to payoffs induced by the play of others and, whenever several games are played simultaneously, players may consider each separately. |
| title | Monotonicity and Bracketing in Games |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.11243 |