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Single-dimensional Contract Design: Efficient Algorithms and Learning

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Bernasconi, Martino, Castiglioni, Matteo, Celli, Andrea
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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