Adversarial Alignment for LLMs Requires Simpler, Reproducible, and More Measurable Objectives
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866912240224960512 |
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| author | Schwinn, Leo Scholten, Yan Wollschläger, Tom Xhonneux, Sophie Casper, Stephen Günnemann, Stephan Gidel, Gauthier |
| author_facet | Schwinn, Leo Scholten, Yan Wollschläger, Tom Xhonneux, Sophie Casper, Stephen Günnemann, Stephan Gidel, Gauthier |
| contents | Misaligned research objectives have considerably hindered progress in adversarial robustness research over the past decade. For instance, an extensive focus on optimizing target metrics, while neglecting rigorous standardized evaluation, has led researchers to pursue ad-hoc heuristic defenses that were seemingly effective. Yet, most of these were exposed as flawed by subsequent evaluations, ultimately contributing little measurable progress to the field. In this position paper, we illustrate that current research on the robustness of large language models (LLMs) risks repeating past patterns with potentially worsened real-world implications. To address this, we argue that realigned objectives are necessary for meaningful progress in adversarial alignment. To this end, we build on established cybersecurity taxonomy to formally define differences between past and emerging threat models that apply to LLMs. Using this framework, we illustrate that progress requires disentangling adversarial alignment into addressable sub-problems and returning to core academic principles, such as measureability, reproducibility, and comparability. Although the field presents significant challenges, the fresh start on adversarial robustness offers the unique opportunity to build on past experience while avoiding previous mistakes. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_11910 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Adversarial Alignment for LLMs Requires Simpler, Reproducible, and More Measurable Objectives Schwinn, Leo Scholten, Yan Wollschläger, Tom Xhonneux, Sophie Casper, Stephen Günnemann, Stephan Gidel, Gauthier Machine Learning Misaligned research objectives have considerably hindered progress in adversarial robustness research over the past decade. For instance, an extensive focus on optimizing target metrics, while neglecting rigorous standardized evaluation, has led researchers to pursue ad-hoc heuristic defenses that were seemingly effective. Yet, most of these were exposed as flawed by subsequent evaluations, ultimately contributing little measurable progress to the field. In this position paper, we illustrate that current research on the robustness of large language models (LLMs) risks repeating past patterns with potentially worsened real-world implications. To address this, we argue that realigned objectives are necessary for meaningful progress in adversarial alignment. To this end, we build on established cybersecurity taxonomy to formally define differences between past and emerging threat models that apply to LLMs. Using this framework, we illustrate that progress requires disentangling adversarial alignment into addressable sub-problems and returning to core academic principles, such as measureability, reproducibility, and comparability. Although the field presents significant challenges, the fresh start on adversarial robustness offers the unique opportunity to build on past experience while avoiding previous mistakes. |
| title | Adversarial Alignment for LLMs Requires Simpler, Reproducible, and More Measurable Objectives |
| topic | Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.11910 |