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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Ma, Ruofei, Tang, Wenpin, Yao, David
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.12026
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