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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.12042 |
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| _version_ | 1866913694026301440 |
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| author | Lee, Wei-Chen Abate, Alessandro Wooldridge, Michael |
| author_facet | Lee, Wei-Chen Abate, Alessandro Wooldridge, Michael |
| contents | Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the Pareto-optimal payoff is unique, but can lead to deadlocks when there are multiple payoffs on the Pareto frontier. We consider a communication partition, where only players within the same coalition can communicate with each other, and they can establish an agreement (a coordinated joint-action) if it is envy-free, credible, and Pareto-optimal. We show that under a natural assumption about symmetry, certain communication partitions can induce social optimal outcomes in singleton congestion games. This game is a reasonable model for a decentralised, anonymous system where players are required to choose from a range of identical resources, and incur costs that are increasing and convex in the total number of players sharing the same resource. The communication partition can be seen as a mechanism for inducing efficient outcomes in this context. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_12042 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Multi-agent coordination via communication partitions Lee, Wei-Chen Abate, Alessandro Wooldridge, Michael Computer Science and Game Theory Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the Pareto-optimal payoff is unique, but can lead to deadlocks when there are multiple payoffs on the Pareto frontier. We consider a communication partition, where only players within the same coalition can communicate with each other, and they can establish an agreement (a coordinated joint-action) if it is envy-free, credible, and Pareto-optimal. We show that under a natural assumption about symmetry, certain communication partitions can induce social optimal outcomes in singleton congestion games. This game is a reasonable model for a decentralised, anonymous system where players are required to choose from a range of identical resources, and incur costs that are increasing and convex in the total number of players sharing the same resource. The communication partition can be seen as a mechanism for inducing efficient outcomes in this context. |
| title | Multi-agent coordination via communication partitions |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.12042 |