Iron Sharpens Iron: Defending Against Attacks in Machine-Generated Text Detection with Adversarial Training

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Li, Yuanfan, Zhang, Zhaohan, Li, Chengzhengxu, Shen, Chao, Liu, Xiaoming
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Li, Yuanfan
Zhang, Zhaohan
Li, Chengzhengxu
Shen, Chao
Liu, Xiaoming
author_facet Li, Yuanfan
Zhang, Zhaohan
Li, Chengzhengxu
Shen, Chao
Liu, Xiaoming
contents Machine-generated Text (MGT) detection is crucial for regulating and attributing online texts. While the existing MGT detectors achieve strong performance, they remain vulnerable to simple perturbations and adversarial attacks. To build an effective defense against malicious perturbations, we view MGT detection from a threat modeling perspective, that is, analyzing the model's vulnerability from an adversary's point of view and exploring effective mitigations. To this end, we introduce an adversarial framework for training a robust MGT detector, named GREedy Adversary PromoTed DefendER (GREATER). The GREATER consists of two key components: an adversary GREATER-A and a detector GREATER-D. The GREATER-D learns to defend against the adversarial attack from GREATER-A and generalizes the defense to other attacks. GREATER-A identifies and perturbs the critical tokens in embedding space, along with greedy search and pruning to generate stealthy and disruptive adversarial examples. Besides, we update the GREATER-A and GREATER-D synchronously, encouraging the GREATER-D to generalize its defense to different attacks and varying attack intensities. Our experimental results across 10 text perturbation strategies and 6 adversarial attacks show that our GREATER-D reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) by 0.67% compared with SOTA defense methods while our GREATER-A is demonstrated to be more effective and efficient than SOTA attack approaches. Codes and dataset are available in https://github.com/Liyuuuu111/GREATER.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_12734
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Iron Sharpens Iron: Defending Against Attacks in Machine-Generated Text Detection with Adversarial Training
Li, Yuanfan
Zhang, Zhaohan
Li, Chengzhengxu
Shen, Chao
Liu, Xiaoming
Cryptography and Security
Computation and Language
Machine-generated Text (MGT) detection is crucial for regulating and attributing online texts. While the existing MGT detectors achieve strong performance, they remain vulnerable to simple perturbations and adversarial attacks. To build an effective defense against malicious perturbations, we view MGT detection from a threat modeling perspective, that is, analyzing the model's vulnerability from an adversary's point of view and exploring effective mitigations. To this end, we introduce an adversarial framework for training a robust MGT detector, named GREedy Adversary PromoTed DefendER (GREATER). The GREATER consists of two key components: an adversary GREATER-A and a detector GREATER-D. The GREATER-D learns to defend against the adversarial attack from GREATER-A and generalizes the defense to other attacks. GREATER-A identifies and perturbs the critical tokens in embedding space, along with greedy search and pruning to generate stealthy and disruptive adversarial examples. Besides, we update the GREATER-A and GREATER-D synchronously, encouraging the GREATER-D to generalize its defense to different attacks and varying attack intensities. Our experimental results across 10 text perturbation strategies and 6 adversarial attacks show that our GREATER-D reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) by 0.67% compared with SOTA defense methods while our GREATER-A is demonstrated to be more effective and efficient than SOTA attack approaches. Codes and dataset are available in https://github.com/Liyuuuu111/GREATER.
title Iron Sharpens Iron: Defending Against Attacks in Machine-Generated Text Detection with Adversarial Training
topic Cryptography and Security
Computation and Language
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.12734