Evaluating the Robustness of Multimodal Agents Against Active Environmental Injection Attacks

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Chen, Yurun, Hu, Xavier, Yin, Keting, Li, Juncheng, Zhang, Shengyu
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Chen, Yurun
Hu, Xavier
Yin, Keting
Li, Juncheng
Zhang, Shengyu
author_facet Chen, Yurun
Hu, Xavier
Yin, Keting
Li, Juncheng
Zhang, Shengyu
contents As researchers continue to optimize AI agents for more effective task execution within operating systems, they often overlook a critical security concern: the ability of these agents to detect "impostors" within their environment. Through an analysis of the agents' operational context, we identify a significant threat-attackers can disguise malicious attacks as environmental elements, injecting active disturbances into the agents' execution processes to manipulate their decision-making. We define this novel threat as the Active Environment Injection Attack (AEIA). Focusing on the interaction mechanisms of the Android OS, we conduct a risk assessment of AEIA and identify two critical security vulnerabilities: (1) Adversarial content injection in multimodal interaction interfaces, where attackers embed adversarial instructions within environmental elements to mislead agent decision-making; and (2) Reasoning gap vulnerabilities in the agent's task execution process, which increase susceptibility to AEIA attacks during reasoning. To evaluate the impact of these vulnerabilities, we propose AEIA-MN, an attack scheme that exploits interaction vulnerabilities in mobile operating systems to assess the robustness of MLLM-based agents. Experimental results show that even advanced MLLMs are highly vulnerable to this attack, achieving a maximum attack success rate of 93% on the AndroidWorld benchmark by combining two vulnerabilities.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_13053
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Evaluating the Robustness of Multimodal Agents Against Active Environmental Injection Attacks
Chen, Yurun
Hu, Xavier
Yin, Keting
Li, Juncheng
Zhang, Shengyu
Computation and Language
As researchers continue to optimize AI agents for more effective task execution within operating systems, they often overlook a critical security concern: the ability of these agents to detect "impostors" within their environment. Through an analysis of the agents' operational context, we identify a significant threat-attackers can disguise malicious attacks as environmental elements, injecting active disturbances into the agents' execution processes to manipulate their decision-making. We define this novel threat as the Active Environment Injection Attack (AEIA). Focusing on the interaction mechanisms of the Android OS, we conduct a risk assessment of AEIA and identify two critical security vulnerabilities: (1) Adversarial content injection in multimodal interaction interfaces, where attackers embed adversarial instructions within environmental elements to mislead agent decision-making; and (2) Reasoning gap vulnerabilities in the agent's task execution process, which increase susceptibility to AEIA attacks during reasoning. To evaluate the impact of these vulnerabilities, we propose AEIA-MN, an attack scheme that exploits interaction vulnerabilities in mobile operating systems to assess the robustness of MLLM-based agents. Experimental results show that even advanced MLLMs are highly vulnerable to this attack, achieving a maximum attack success rate of 93% on the AndroidWorld benchmark by combining two vulnerabilities.
title Evaluating the Robustness of Multimodal Agents Against Active Environmental Injection Attacks
topic Computation and Language
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.13053