Phantom Events: Demystifying the Issues of Log Forgery in Blockchain
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866916620309364736 |
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| author | Liu, Yixuan Dong, Yuxin Liu, Ye Luo, Xiapu Li, Yi |
| author_facet | Liu, Yixuan Dong, Yuxin Liu, Ye Luo, Xiapu Li, Yi |
| contents | With the rapid development of blockchain technology, transaction logs play a central role in various applications, including decentralized exchanges, wallets, cross-chain bridges, and other third-party services. However, these logs, particularly those based on smart contract events, are highly susceptible to manipulation and forgery, creating substantial security risks across the ecosystem. To address this issue, we present the first in-depth security analysis of transaction log forgery in EVM-based blockchains, a phenomenon we term Phantom Events. We systematically model five types of attacks and propose a tool designed to detect event forgery vulnerabilities in smart contracts. Our evaluation demonstrates that our approach outperforms existing tools in identifying potential phantom events. Furthermore, we have successfully identified real-world instances for all five types of attacks across multiple decentralized applications. Finally, we call on community developers to take proactive steps to address these critical security vulnerabilities. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_13513 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Phantom Events: Demystifying the Issues of Log Forgery in Blockchain Liu, Yixuan Dong, Yuxin Liu, Ye Luo, Xiapu Li, Yi Cryptography and Security With the rapid development of blockchain technology, transaction logs play a central role in various applications, including decentralized exchanges, wallets, cross-chain bridges, and other third-party services. However, these logs, particularly those based on smart contract events, are highly susceptible to manipulation and forgery, creating substantial security risks across the ecosystem. To address this issue, we present the first in-depth security analysis of transaction log forgery in EVM-based blockchains, a phenomenon we term Phantom Events. We systematically model five types of attacks and propose a tool designed to detect event forgery vulnerabilities in smart contracts. Our evaluation demonstrates that our approach outperforms existing tools in identifying potential phantom events. Furthermore, we have successfully identified real-world instances for all five types of attacks across multiple decentralized applications. Finally, we call on community developers to take proactive steps to address these critical security vulnerabilities. |
| title | Phantom Events: Demystifying the Issues of Log Forgery in Blockchain |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.13513 |