Why Safeguarded Ships Run Aground? Aligned Large Language Models' Safety Mechanisms Tend to Be Anchored in The Template Region

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Leong, Chak Tou, Yin, Qingyu, Wang, Jian, Li, Wenjie
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Leong, Chak Tou
Yin, Qingyu
Wang, Jian
Li, Wenjie
author_facet Leong, Chak Tou
Yin, Qingyu
Wang, Jian
Li, Wenjie
contents The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) remains vulnerable, as their initial behavior can be easily jailbroken by even relatively simple attacks. Since infilling a fixed template between the input instruction and initial model output is a common practice for existing LLMs, we hypothesize that this template is a key factor behind their vulnerabilities: LLMs' safety-related decision-making overly relies on the aggregated information from the template region, which largely influences these models' safety behavior. We refer to this issue as template-anchored safety alignment. In this paper, we conduct extensive experiments and verify that template-anchored safety alignment is widespread across various aligned LLMs. Our mechanistic analyses demonstrate how it leads to models' susceptibility when encountering inference-time jailbreak attacks. Furthermore, we show that detaching safety mechanisms from the template region is promising in mitigating vulnerabilities to jailbreak attacks. We encourage future research to develop more robust safety alignment techniques that reduce reliance on the template region.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_13946
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Why Safeguarded Ships Run Aground? Aligned Large Language Models' Safety Mechanisms Tend to Be Anchored in The Template Region
Leong, Chak Tou
Yin, Qingyu
Wang, Jian
Li, Wenjie
Computation and Language
Artificial Intelligence
Cryptography and Security
The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) remains vulnerable, as their initial behavior can be easily jailbroken by even relatively simple attacks. Since infilling a fixed template between the input instruction and initial model output is a common practice for existing LLMs, we hypothesize that this template is a key factor behind their vulnerabilities: LLMs' safety-related decision-making overly relies on the aggregated information from the template region, which largely influences these models' safety behavior. We refer to this issue as template-anchored safety alignment. In this paper, we conduct extensive experiments and verify that template-anchored safety alignment is widespread across various aligned LLMs. Our mechanistic analyses demonstrate how it leads to models' susceptibility when encountering inference-time jailbreak attacks. Furthermore, we show that detaching safety mechanisms from the template region is promising in mitigating vulnerabilities to jailbreak attacks. We encourage future research to develop more robust safety alignment techniques that reduce reliance on the template region.
title Why Safeguarded Ships Run Aground? Aligned Large Language Models' Safety Mechanisms Tend to Be Anchored in The Template Region
topic Computation and Language
Artificial Intelligence
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.13946