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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.14154 |
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| _version_ | 1866916621625327616 |
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| author | Heo, Eun Jeong Manjunath, Vikram |
| author_facet | Heo, Eun Jeong Manjunath, Vikram |
| contents | In allocating objects via lotteries, it is common to consider ordinal rules that rely solely on how agents rank degenerate lotteries. While ordinality is often imposed due to cognitive or informational constraints, we provide another justification from an axiomatic perspective: for three-agent problems, the combination of efficiency, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and a weak form of continuity collectively implies ordinality. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_14154 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Ordinality in Random Allocation Heo, Eun Jeong Manjunath, Vikram Theoretical Economics In allocating objects via lotteries, it is common to consider ordinal rules that rely solely on how agents rank degenerate lotteries. While ordinality is often imposed due to cognitive or informational constraints, we provide another justification from an axiomatic perspective: for three-agent problems, the combination of efficiency, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and a weak form of continuity collectively implies ordinality. |
| title | Ordinality in Random Allocation |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.14154 |