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Human Misperception of Generative-AI Alignment: A Laboratory Experiment

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	He, Kevin, Shorrer, Ran, Xia, Mengjia
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2025
Materias:	Theoretical Economics Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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