A New Solution for Cooperative Game with Public Externalities
Fuente:
arXiv
Enregistré dans:
| Auteurs principaux: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
|
| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | |
| Tags: |
Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
| _version_ | 1866918229190901760 |
|---|---|
| author | Fan, Juanjuan Wang, Ying |
| author_facet | Fan, Juanjuan Wang, Ying |
| contents | This study proposes a novel solution concept--the w-value--for cooperative games with public externalities. The w-value is axiomatically founded on three principles: Pareto Optimality (PO), Market Equilibrium (ME), and Fiscal Balance (FB), which together ensure a fair and economically sound distribution of gains. We establish its existence, uniqueness, and an accompanying implementation mechanism. A key theoretical advantage is its strong stability: the w-value lies within the core, specifically the γ-core making it resistant to coalitional deviations. Moreover, its computational efficiency facilitates practical application to complex real-world problems, offering a clear advantage over more cumbersome alternatives. These properties make the w-value a superior framework for analyzing cooperation under public externalities. A numerical illustration demonstrates the step-by-step calculation process. Finally, we apply the concept to international climate negotiations, showing how it provides a theoretical rationale for the shift from rigid mandatory emission reduction systems toward the flexible structure of Nationally Determined Contributions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_16800 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A New Solution for Cooperative Game with Public Externalities Fan, Juanjuan Wang, Ying Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory This study proposes a novel solution concept--the w-value--for cooperative games with public externalities. The w-value is axiomatically founded on three principles: Pareto Optimality (PO), Market Equilibrium (ME), and Fiscal Balance (FB), which together ensure a fair and economically sound distribution of gains. We establish its existence, uniqueness, and an accompanying implementation mechanism. A key theoretical advantage is its strong stability: the w-value lies within the core, specifically the γ-core making it resistant to coalitional deviations. Moreover, its computational efficiency facilitates practical application to complex real-world problems, offering a clear advantage over more cumbersome alternatives. These properties make the w-value a superior framework for analyzing cooperation under public externalities. A numerical illustration demonstrates the step-by-step calculation process. Finally, we apply the concept to international climate negotiations, showing how it provides a theoretical rationale for the shift from rigid mandatory emission reduction systems toward the flexible structure of Nationally Determined Contributions. |
| title | A New Solution for Cooperative Game with Public Externalities |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.16800 |