Joint Value Estimation and Bidding in Repeated First-Price Auctions
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866915870236737536 |
|---|---|
| author | Wen, Yuxiao Han, Yanjun Zhou, Zhengyuan |
| author_facet | Wen, Yuxiao Han, Yanjun Zhou, Zhengyuan |
| contents | We study regret minimization in repeated first-price auctions (FPAs), where a bidder observes only the realized outcome after each auction -- win or loss. This setup reflects practical scenarios in online display advertising where the actual value of an impression depends on the difference between two potential outcomes, such as clicks or conversion rates, when the auction is won versus lost. We incorporate causal inference into this framework and analyze the challenging case where only the treatment effect admits a simple dependence on observable features. Under this framework, we propose algorithms that jointly estimate private values and optimize bidding strategies under two different feedback types on the highest other bid (HOB): the full-information feedback where the HOB is always revealed, and the binary feedback where the bidder only observes the win-loss indicator. Under both cases, our algorithms are shown to achieve near-optimal regret bounds. Notably, our framework enjoys a unique feature that the treatments are actively chosen, and hence eliminates the need for the overlap condition commonly required in causal inference. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_17292 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Joint Value Estimation and Bidding in Repeated First-Price Auctions Wen, Yuxiao Han, Yanjun Zhou, Zhengyuan Machine Learning Computer Science and Game Theory Information Theory Methodology We study regret minimization in repeated first-price auctions (FPAs), where a bidder observes only the realized outcome after each auction -- win or loss. This setup reflects practical scenarios in online display advertising where the actual value of an impression depends on the difference between two potential outcomes, such as clicks or conversion rates, when the auction is won versus lost. We incorporate causal inference into this framework and analyze the challenging case where only the treatment effect admits a simple dependence on observable features. Under this framework, we propose algorithms that jointly estimate private values and optimize bidding strategies under two different feedback types on the highest other bid (HOB): the full-information feedback where the HOB is always revealed, and the binary feedback where the bidder only observes the win-loss indicator. Under both cases, our algorithms are shown to achieve near-optimal regret bounds. Notably, our framework enjoys a unique feature that the treatments are actively chosen, and hence eliminates the need for the overlap condition commonly required in causal inference. |
| title | Joint Value Estimation and Bidding in Repeated First-Price Auctions |
| topic | Machine Learning Computer Science and Game Theory Information Theory Methodology |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.17292 |