Pareto-undominated strategy-proof rules in economies with multidimensional single-peaked preferences
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866910843222884352 |
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| author | Bonifacio, Agustin G. |
| author_facet | Bonifacio, Agustin G. |
| contents | In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other strategy-proof rules. Specifically, we: (i) establish a sufficient condition for a rule to be Pareto-undominated strategy-proof; (ii) introduce a broad class of rules satisfying this property by extending the family of "sequential allotment rules" to the multidimensional setting; and (iii) provide a new characterization of the "multidimensional uniform rule" involving Pareto-undominated strategy-proofness. Results (i) and (iii) generalize previous findings that were only applicable to the two-agent case. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_17682 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Pareto-undominated strategy-proof rules in economies with multidimensional single-peaked preferences Bonifacio, Agustin G. Theoretical Economics In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other strategy-proof rules. Specifically, we: (i) establish a sufficient condition for a rule to be Pareto-undominated strategy-proof; (ii) introduce a broad class of rules satisfying this property by extending the family of "sequential allotment rules" to the multidimensional setting; and (iii) provide a new characterization of the "multidimensional uniform rule" involving Pareto-undominated strategy-proofness. Results (i) and (iii) generalize previous findings that were only applicable to the two-agent case. |
| title | Pareto-undominated strategy-proof rules in economies with multidimensional single-peaked preferences |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.17682 |