Multi-Dimensional Screening with Endogenous Information Disclosure
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866918174074601472 |
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| author | Cai, Yang Li, Yingkai Wu, Jinzhao |
| author_facet | Cai, Yang Li, Yingkai Wu, Jinzhao |
| contents | We study multi-product monopoly pricing where the seller jointly designs the selling mechanism and the information structure for the buyer to learn his values. Unlike the case with exogenous information, we show that when the seller controls information, even uniform pricing guarantees at least half of the optimal revenue. Moreover, for negatively affiliated or exchangeable value distributions, deterministic pricing is revenue-optimal. Our results highlight the power of information design in making pricing mechanisms approximately optimal in multi-dimensional settings. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_17809 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Multi-Dimensional Screening with Endogenous Information Disclosure Cai, Yang Li, Yingkai Wu, Jinzhao Computer Science and Game Theory We study multi-product monopoly pricing where the seller jointly designs the selling mechanism and the information structure for the buyer to learn his values. Unlike the case with exogenous information, we show that when the seller controls information, even uniform pricing guarantees at least half of the optimal revenue. Moreover, for negatively affiliated or exchangeable value distributions, deterministic pricing is revenue-optimal. Our results highlight the power of information design in making pricing mechanisms approximately optimal in multi-dimensional settings. |
| title | Multi-Dimensional Screening with Endogenous Information Disclosure |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.17809 |