State Machine Model for The Update Framework (TUF)
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866910843857272832 |
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| author | Romansky, Brian Mazzuchi, Thomas Sarkani, Shahram |
| author_facet | Romansky, Brian Mazzuchi, Thomas Sarkani, Shahram |
| contents | The Update Framework or TUF was developed to address several known weaknesses that have been observed in software update distribution and validation systems. Unlike conventional secure software distribution methods where there may be a single digital signature applied to each update, TUF introduces four distinct roles each with one or more signing key, that must participate in the update process. This approach increases the total size of each update package and increases the number of signatures that each client system must validate. As system architects consider the transition to post-quantum algorithms, understanding the impact of new signature algorithms on a TUF deployment becomes a significant consideration. In this work we introduce a state machine model that accounts for the cumulative impact of of signature algorithm selection when used with TUF for software updates. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_18092 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | State Machine Model for The Update Framework (TUF) Romansky, Brian Mazzuchi, Thomas Sarkani, Shahram Software Engineering Cryptography and Security The Update Framework or TUF was developed to address several known weaknesses that have been observed in software update distribution and validation systems. Unlike conventional secure software distribution methods where there may be a single digital signature applied to each update, TUF introduces four distinct roles each with one or more signing key, that must participate in the update process. This approach increases the total size of each update package and increases the number of signatures that each client system must validate. As system architects consider the transition to post-quantum algorithms, understanding the impact of new signature algorithms on a TUF deployment becomes a significant consideration. In this work we introduce a state machine model that accounts for the cumulative impact of of signature algorithm selection when used with TUF for software updates. |
| title | State Machine Model for The Update Framework (TUF) |
| topic | Software Engineering Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.18092 |